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“We Don’t Speak to Evil”:
The Dynamics of US-Iranian Mistrust
Nicholas J. Wheeler
The current uncertainties about Iran’s motives and intentions re-
flect the interplay of the psychological and material dimensions
of the security dilemma in international politics. In this article
NicholasWheeler shows how the ideological fundamentalism that
animates the Bush White House and its fellow travellers has led
the administration to replace the uncertainties about Tehran’s nu-
clear intentions with the certainty that Iran has aggressive motives
and intent. The problem with ideological fundamentalism is that
it closes down the possibility that others might be acting out of
fear and mistrust rather than malevolence, and crucially, it disre-
gards the role that one’s own actions might play in provoking that
fear.
Once again the storm clouds of war are gathering over a country in
the Middle East suspected of covertly developing nuclear weapons.
The United States has imposed its toughest sanctions on Iran since
the Iranian revolution of 1979 in response to Tehran’s defiance of UN
Security Council resolutions demanding a halt to its nuclear pro-
gramme. As the war of words heats up between the White House
and the government of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, it is necessary to
ask whether there is an alternative way to resolve this crisis that does
not rely on coercion, including ultimately the use of force.
There are justified uncertainties about whether Iran is developing
a nuclear weapons capability. But what has to be challenged is the as-
sumption that because of the Islamist character of the present lead-
ership in Tehran, Iran has malignmotives towards theWest, and that
it will seek a nuclear weapons capability to prosecute these hostile in-
tentions. To make such an assumption is to demonstrate ideological
fundamentalism* on the part of observers, leading to the belief that
Iran must be cheating on its obligation not to develop nuclear
weapons under the 1968 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty of which
it is a signatory.
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The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) based in Vienna
exists to reassure states that others are not secretly developing nu-
clear weapons under the guise of peaceful nuclear programmes. For
those who perceive Tehran as implacably opposed toWestern inter-
ests and values, the IAEA cannot be relied upon to detect — let alone
respond to — Iran’s non-compliance with its non-proliferation obli-
gations. Instead, policing the spread of nuclear weapons requires the
major powers, preferably through the agency of the UN Security
Council, to sanction those who transgress non-proliferation norms.
If such collective UN action is not possible, concernedWestern states
will have to consider acting without UN legitimation, as the United
States and its allies did in invading Iraq in 2003.
The Security Dilemma
As suggested above, one helpful way of thinking about the dynam-
ics of recent US-Iranian relations is the concept of the security
dilemma. The starting point for such theorising is that all human re-
lations take place in an existential condition of uncertainty about the
motives and intentions of others. This is what philosophers call the
“other minds problem”. In relation to the biggest and most violent
stage of all — international politics — this means that governments
(their decision-makers, military planners, foreign policy analysts etc.)
can never be one hundred per cent certain about the current and fu-
ture motives and intentions of those able to harm them in a military
sense. Those responsible have to decide whether a state’s actions —
especially its military behaviour — signal that they have defensive
or self-protection purposes only (to enhance security in an uncertain
world) or whether they are for offensive purposes (to seek to change
the status quo to their advantage). Decision-makers then need to de-
termine how to react. Should they signal, by words and deeds, that
they will react in kind, thereby building up a capability in the event
that the other’s intentions prove to be hostile? Or should they seek to
signal reassurance?
These psychological dynamics are compounded by the problem of
ambiguous symbolism. The term refers to the difficulty (manywould
say the impossibility) of safely distinguishing between “offensive”
and “defensive” weapons. Even if states profess that their weaponry
is only to be used in self-defence after an attack, others will worry
that such capabilities might be used for offensive purposes. This was
the security dilemma that confronted NATO and the Warsaw Pact
during the ColdWar. Each side professed defensive intent, but both
alliances had offensive military strategies that led policy-makers and
planners on each side to question the others peaceful intentions.
The problem of ambiguous symbolism arises in relation to de-
ployed weapons, but in the case of Iran’s nuclear programme our in-
terest lies in the dual-use character of civil nuclear technology. The
boundary between “peaceful” and “military” uses of nuclear tech-
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nology throws up a particularly vexing dilemma for policy-makers
because the boundary itself is blurred, yet once crossed it gives the
transgressor immense weapons potential. The UN Secretary Gen-
eral’s High-level Panel on “Threats, Challenges and Change”
warned in 2004 that, as a consequence of the diffusion of civil nu-
clear technologies to more and more states, at least forty govern-
ments were in the position to move quickly to nuclear weapons
status should a political decision be taken. The problem of ambigu-
ous symbolism has been graphically illustrated in the Iranian case
by the uranium enrichment activities at its Natanz plant. These were
ostensibly compliant with Article IV of the Non Proliferation Treaty
(NPT) which entitles signatories to the peaceful benefits of nuclear
energy, but the decision to hide the facility from the IAEA inspec-
tors aroused suspicions about Tehran’s motives and intentions.
Spiralling Mistrust
Ideological convictions have often been decisive in how policy-mak-
ers have resolved uncertainties about the motives and intentions of
others. Ideological fundamentalism is a mindset which assigns
enemy status because of what the other is — its political identity —
rather than how it actually behaves. The Bush Administration’s ver-
sion of the democratic peace theory (the belief that democracies do
not fight each other) has led it to engage in the foreign-policy equiv-
alent of “criminal profiling”. What determines a state’s propensity
for aggression, according to the White House, is its internal charac-
ter. And it follows that if the “rogue” regimes can be removed from
power, the underlying source of security competition will be elimi-
nated. The violent overthrow of the Iraqi regime in 2003 represented
the high-water mark of this strategy — to this point.
In his 2002 State of the Union Address, President Bush described
Iraq, Iran and North Korea as the “Axis of Evil”. Believing that the
domestic nature of these so-called “rogue” states committed them
to the export of aggression and terror, and that there could be no
long-term coexistence between the United States and such regimes,
the Bush Administration defended a policy of preventive war and
regime change. Bush warned, “I will not wait on events, while dan-
gers gather. I will not stand by, as peril draws closer and closer. The
United States of America will not permit the world’s most dangerous
regimes to threaten us with the world’s most destructive weapons.”
It is this mindset that has shaped the Bush Administration’s policy
towards Iran’s nuclear programme, leading the administration to in-
terpret Iran’s development of fuel cycle capabilities as an offensive
move, even when the latter claimed to be compliant with its NPT ob-
ligations. Despite the ambiguous symbolism of Iran’s nuclear pro-
gramme, the ideological fundamentalists in the White House have
imputed malign motives and intentions regarding Tehran’s deter-
mination to master the technology of uranium enrichment.
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Iran has been less than transparent in its nuclear dealings. Mo-
hamed ElBaradei, the Egyptian Director of the IAEA, reported in
September that “the agency remains unable to verify certain aspects
relevant to the scope and nature of Iran’s nuclear programme.”*
However, in a move that has put himself and the agency on a clear
collision course with Washington, ElBaradei maintains that Iran is
being cooperative in resolving the outstanding issues, and that he is
confident that the existing IAEA system of safeguards can provide
the necessary reassurance that the Islamic Republic is not secretly
building a bomb. Here, the Director-General is placing his hopes in
Iran ratifying and implementing the “Additional Protocol” which it
has signed. This provides the Agency with widened powers of phys-
ical access to make it more difficult for states to conceal illicit activi-
ties. ElBaradei has reluctantly accepted that Iran will not stop its
uranium enrichment activities at the Natanz plant, and achieving
Iranianmastery of the complete nuclear fuel-cycle seems to be a goal
that unites all the factions across the Iranian political spectrum. Yet
it does not follow from acceptance of this political reality that Iran
will necessarily expand its pilot plant at Natanz into a full-scale in-
dustrial programme of enrichment. Iran might join that growing
group of states with the technological capability to go nuclear, but
which show no signs of translating this into a weapons programme
(e.g. Brazil, Japan, Germany, and Canada).
Allowing Iran to reach a technological position where it could de-
velop the bomb is anathema to those driving US policy towards
Tehran. Not only does Washington fear that a revolutionary Iran
equipped with weapons of mass destruction (WMD) would be a re-
gional threat, especially to Israel, they also fear the spectre of current
or future Iranian leaders providing fissile materials to Islamist
groups using terror tactics. Those regimes that are not acceptably
democratic to the United States will never be trusted with nuclear
weapons, or even indigenous fuel-cycle capabilities claimed to be for
peaceful purposes only. The conviction guiding US policy is that the
internal nature and character of the Islamic Republic makes it deter-
mined to acquire nuclear weapons, and that as a result any large-
scale programme of uranium enrichment represents an unacceptable
security threat to Washington and its allies. Consequently, regime
change (with Iran becoming a democratic ally) is the only policy that
will satisfy Washington that Tehran can be trusted with indigenous
control over the nuclear fuel-cycle.
The danger of ideological fundamentalism in fuelling security
competition is compoundedwhen both sides exhibit the samemind-
set. President Ahmadinejad has viewed the world in no less
Manichean terms than President Bush. He even went so far as to call
for Zionism to be “wiped off the face of the Earth” in a speech to a
conference on a “WorldWithout Zionism” in Tehran in 2005, insist-
ing that there could be no accommodation with Israel or its US spon-
*Greg Webb, “ElBa-
radei Defends Nu-
clear Plan with Iran”,
Global Security
Newswire, 10 Sep-
tember 2007, http://
204.71.60.35/d_news
wire/issues/2007_9_
10.html, accessed 15
October 2007.
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sor. Such inflammatory language has weakened the position of those
in the West who have argued that far from Iran posing an implaca-
ble threat to the West, both Tehran and Washington are trapped in
a spiral of mistrust where each is reacting to the negative behaviour
of the other.
From Provocation to Trust
At the same time as imputing malign motives and intentions to an-
other state, policy-makers with a peaceful/defensive self-image fail
to appreciate that their own actions might be seen as threatening by
that state. The British historian Herbert Butterfield was the first to
capture how these psychological dynamics can work to exacerbate
conflict. Diplomats, he wrote, “may vividly feel the terrible fear that
[they] have of the other party, but [they] cannot enter into the [oth-
ers] counter-fear, or even understand why [they] should be particu-
larly nervous.” He went on to say that it is “never possible for you
to realise or remember properly that since [the other] cannot see the
inside of your mind, [they] can never have the same assurance of
your intentions that you have.”* There is strong evidence thatWash-
ington and Tehran are trapped in spiralling mistrust of this kind.
Both see themselves as on the defensive against an implacable foe,
and each fails to appreciate that its own actions might be provoking
fear and insecurity on the part of the other. Developing and elabo-
rating Butterfield’s work, Robert Jervis in the 1970s had described
these dynamics as the “spiral model”.* Jervis argued that what fu-
elled spirals was the inability of policy-makers to appreciate that they
were ensnared in one. I illustrate these dynamics below in relation to
US-Iranian interactions.
Washington does not give credit to the extent its past behaviour
has created fear in theminds of Iranian policy-makers as to future US
motives and intentions. Here, it is important to realise how far sus-
picion and mistrust are fed by historical memories. From Tehran’s
perspective, Bush’s policy of regime change in his “Axis of Evil”
speech — and the US led attack against Iraq the following year — only
served to reinforce fears that go back to the coup that the United
States and Britain orchestrated against Mohammad Mosaddeq, the
democratically elected Prime Minister of Iran which brought the
Shah to power in 1953.
The inability of US policy-makers to put themselves in the shoes
of their Iranian counterparts is mirrored in the failure of the latter to
understand that their past behaviour creates fear in Washington
about Iran’s motives and intentions. Here, the event which is seared
in the collective USmemory is Iran’s kidnapping of the hostages after
the Iranian Revolution. Iran’s continuing support for Islamist groups
using terror tactics — notably Hamas and Hizbollah — and its an-
tipathy towards Israel reinforces US perceptions that Tehran is de-
termined to export its revolution by violent means, and that a
Herbert Butterfield,
History and Human
Relations (Collins,
1951).
*Robert Jervis, Percep-
tion and Misperception
in International Politics
(Princeton University
Press, 1976).
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confrontation with Iran is unavoidable.
There will always be uncertainty (and historical disagreement) as
to whether observers and policy-makers were correct in their im-
puting of motives and intentions to others. But if the leaders of the
United States and Iran are trapped today in dynamics (ideological
fundamentalism and peaceful/defensive self-images) that have gen-
erated mutual fear and mistrust, escaping this situation will require
very different policies to those currently being pursued by both
Washington and Tehran. It will require leaders, who are prepared
to act on the assumption that their state’s actions have provoked le-
gitimate fears on the part of the other, and to make corresponding
moves that signal reassurance. Such a realisation seems unlikely
today as the ideological fundamentalists in Washington and Tehran
stake out seemingly irreconcilable positions on the nuclear issue, be-
lieving that any concessions will be exploited by their adversary as
a sign of weakness. As US-Iranian relations become increasingly
tense, it is worth remembering that Iran had made a highly signifi-
cant move aimed at building trust with Washington in 2003.
Despite the ideological fundamentalists in theWhite House mak-
ing Iran one of the targets in the “Axis of Evil” speech, the then Iran-
ian President Mohammad Khatami was able to enter into the
counter-fear of his US counterparts and appreciate that Iran’s actions
might be seen as threatening by the United States. To reassureWash-
ington of Iran’s peaceful intent, Iranian negotiators in a dramatic
move proposed, in Gordon Corera’s words, to “put everything on
the table — including being completely open about its nuclear pro-
gramme, helping to stabilise Iraq, ending its support for Palestinian
militant groups and help in disarming Hezbollah.” What Iran
wanted in return, according to Corera, was a US statement that “Iran
did not belong to ‘the axis of evil’, and steps leading to the normali-
sation of relations.” But the Bush Administration had just toppled
Saddam Hussein and was in a state of ideological and military
hubris, believing that the time was right for regime change in the
Middle East. Larry Wilkerson, Chief of Staff to US Secretary of State
Colin Powell, said in an interview in 2006 that the hardliners’ re-
sponse to the invitation to talk to Tehran was “We don’t speak to
evil”.*
The opportunity that had briefly opened up for a breakthrough in
US-Iranian relations was lost. The rebuff to Khatami’s trust-building
initiative strengthened the position of the hardliners in Iran who, in
a mirror image of ideological fundamentalist thinking in the United
States, believed that Washington’s ideology and values posed a fun-
damental threat to the security of the Islamic Republic.†
Four years later, the United States is prepared to speak to “evil”,
but only with the precondition that Iran suspends its uranium en-
richment programme. From Tehran’s perspective, this position is one
that fails to accord the Islamic Republic the dignity and respect that
*Gordon Corera,
“Iran’s Gulf of Mis-
understanding with
the United States”,
BBC News, 25 Sep-
tember 2006, http://
www.news.bbc.
co.uk/1/hi/world/
middle_east/
5377914.stm, accessed
12 January 2007.
†Ali M. Ansari, Con-
fronting Iran: The Fail-
ure of American
Foreign Policy and the
Roots of Mistrust
(Hurst & Company,
2006), and Corera,
“Iran’s Gulf of Mis-
understanding with
the United States”.
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it feels entitled to. Iran is a proud nation with its history reaching
back to the days of Persian supremacy, and it is virtually inconceiv-
able that its current rulers will accede to US demands. Indeed, the
fundamentalists in Tehran believe that any concessions on the nu-
clear issue will be interpreted in Washington as a sign of weakness.
According to OmidMemarian, Iranian policy-makers reason that “if
the US neo-conservatives have already decided to pursue the mili-
tary option against Iran, nothingwill stop them... bymatchingWash-
ington’s high-profile military manoeuvres and belligerent rhetoric,
Iran’s hardliners seek to remind the George W. Bush administration
that any form of war would carry a heavy military cost to the US.”*
The US demand that Iran suspend its enrichment activities is
backed up by two Security Council resolutions adopted under Chap-
ter VII of the UN Charter. Resolution 1696 was adopted on 31 July
2006 and demanded that Tehran cease all sensitive nuclear activities.
This was followed by Resolution 1747 on 24 March 2007 that im-
posed limited sanctions against the Islamic Republic for its failure to
comply with the first resolution. It is clearly essential to the credibil-
ity of the Council, as the guardian of international peace and secu-
rity, that Iran is not seen to have totally disregarded its obligation to
comply with these resolutions.
One imaginative way to end the current impasse over the nuclear
issue is ElBaradei’s idea that the United States and Iran agree to “A
double time-out of all enrichment-related activities and of sanc-
tions”.* This would allow both sides to agree to talks without losing
face. The question is whether the ideological fundamentalists in
Washington and Tehran are prepared to engage in a genuine dia-
logue with their ideological foe.
If the United States and Iran do pull back from confrontation and
begin negotiations, the success of these will depend on how far both
sides come to understand that their adversary might be acting out of
fear and not aggression, including crucially, the role that their own
actions may play in provoking that fear. Such awareness is only the
first step, and the challenge is to fashion polices that effectively sig-
nal a state’s peaceful intent. This requires Tehran or Washington to
take a “leap in the dark”. The phrase comes from Robert Schuman,
the French Foreign Minister, in relation to the launching of the Eu-
ropean Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), the first major act of Eu-
ropean integration. As with the ECSC, it refers to a dramatic act
which seeks to express and bring about a relationship of trust.
What kinds of “leaps in the dark” would build trust today be-
tween the United States and Iran? Can leaders in Washington and
Tehran find the courage and imagination to take the moves that
might transform US-Iranian relations, and with it the prospects for
peacefully resolving the nuclear issue. The best context for address-
ing the proliferation challenge posed by Iran’s nuclear programme
would be an agreement on the elimination of all weapons of mass
*Omid Memarian,
“Iran: prepared for
the worst”, Open
Democracy, 30 Octo-
ber 2007, www.open-
democracy.net/articl
e/democracy_iran/ir
an_prepared_fir_the_
worst, accessed 15
November 2007.
*Greg Webb, ‘ElBa-
radei Defends Nu-
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October 2007.
13Iran
destruction in theMiddle East. Achieving this goal would clearly re-
quire Israel’s nuclear weapons to be included, and securing this will,
in turn, depend upon building a lasting peace between Israel and the
Palestinians.
Unthinkable? Perhaps. Yet are such possibilities any more unre-
alisable than a suggestion in 1983 that a US President, who had la-
belled the Soviet Union “the evil empire”, would, within a few years,
have become a trusting partner with his Soviet counterpart in start-
ing to dismantle the superpower military confrontation of the Cold
War? What is all too clearly thinkable is that ideological fundamen-
talists will continue to dominate policy-making in both Tehran and
Washington. If this happens, the prospects for a peaceful resolution
of the US-Iranian nuclear stand-off will remain bleak.
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